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Abstract—Among the various types of spyware, screenloggers 
are distinguished by their ability to capture screenshots. This gives 
them considerable nuisance capacity, giving rise to theft of 
sensitive data or, failing that, to serious invasions of the privacy of 
users. Several examples of attacks relying on this screen capture 
feature have been documented in recent years. However, there is 
not sufficient empirical and experimental evidence on this topic. 
Indeed, to the best of our knowledge, there is no dataset dedicated 
to screenshot-taking malware until today. The lack of datasets or 
common testbed platforms makes it difficult to analyse and study 
their behaviour in order to develop effective countermeasures. The 
screenshot feature is often a smart feature that does not activate 
automatically once the malware has infected the machine; the 
activation mechanisms of this function are often more complex. 
Consequently, a dataset which is completely dedicated to them 
would make it possible to better understand the subtleties of 
triggering screenshots and even to learn to distinguish them from 
the legitimate applications widely present on devices. The main 
purpose of this paper is to build such a dataset and analyse the 
behaviour of screenloggers. 
Keywords—Spyware, screenlogger, malware dataset, 
behaviour analysis, malware detection, screen capture, remote 
access trojan. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Screenlogging is one of the most dangerous functionalities 
in today’s spyware as it can highly contribute to reach the 
potential goals of a hacker. Cybercriminals take advantage of 
the fact that people are using internet more to carry out 
harmful screen capture attacks [59]. MITRE [3] lists 60 
examples of widely known malware programs with the 
screenshot capability. 
By closely examining these examples, we observe that 
screenlogger users can be divided into two categories: 
financially motivated actors and state-sponsored actors.  The 
first category targets important industrial companies (e.g. 
Bronze Butler [4]), online banking users (e.g. RTM [9], FIN7 
[10], Svpeng [4]), and even banks themselves (e.g. Carbanak 
[11], Silence [12]). The second category, which is even more 
problematic, targets critical infrastructures all over the world. 
For instance, the malware TinyZbot [13], a variant of Zeus [7], 
targets critical infrastructures in more than 16 countries. More 
precisely, the targets can be democratic institutions (e.g. 
Xagent targeting the DCCC and DNC in the US [18] or Regin 
[8] which has been taking screenshots for at least six years in 
the IT network of the EU headquarters), diplomatic agencies 
(e.g. ScarCruft, a North Korean malware targeting diplomatic 
agencies [14]) or the US’s defense contractors (e.g. IronTiger). 
Malware authors are also very inventive when it comes to 
using screen captures in a malicious way. Indeed, screen 
captures can be used for a wide range of purposes. Some 
malware only take one screenshot during their whole 
execution for reconnaissance purposes (see if the victim is 
worth infecting e.g. Cannon [15], Zebrocy [16]) or to hide 
what is happening on the victim’s screen by displaying a 
screenshot of their current desktop (e.g. FinFisher [16][17]). 
Others take numerous screen captures for a close monitoring 
of the victim’s activity. This can allow to steal sensitive 
intellectual property data (Bronze Butler [4]), banking 
credentials (RTM [9], FIN7 [10], Xagent [18]), or to monitor 
the day to day activity of banking clerks to understand the 
banks’ internal mechanisms (Carbanak [11], Silence [12]). 
The screenshot functionality is sometimes the unique 
functionality used in some phases of an attack in order to make 
observations while remaining stealthy. It is for example the 
case of the Carbanak attack targeting banking employees [5] 
[6]. The attackers used the screengrabs to create a video 
recording of daily activity on employees’ computers, 
amassing knowledge about internal processes before stealing 
money by impersonating legitimate local users during the next 
phase of the attack. 
In addition to these dangerous capabilities allowed by 
screen captures, it is even more difficult to fight this threat, as 
this functionality is used more and more by legitimate 
applications. Paradoxically, there are few works in the 
literature about screenloggers, making this threat relatively 
unknown. To the best of our knowledge, the only studies 
focusing on it are limited to very specific questions, which are 
the Android Debug Bridge’s vulnerability allowing 
screenshots taking on Android smartphones [27, 28, 29, 30] 
and screenshot protection during authentication using virtual 
keyboards [31, 32, 33]. Thus, there is no general view of the 
threat represented by screenshot-taking malware and how this 
functionality is implemented by attackers. Therefore, the aim 
of this paper is twofold: building a representative screenlogger 
dataset and analysing it to identify the most promising criteria 
for screenlogger detection. 
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After studying the existing datasets (Section II) and briefly 
describing our threat and system models (Section III), our 
methodology will be discussed (Section IV). We will then 
present the first existing screenshot-taking malware and 
legitimate applications dataset as well as some insights into 
their behaviour in the results section (Section V). 
II. RELATED WORK 
Although there are many malware datasets available [34-
49] containing diverse categories of malware, there is no 
existing dataset dedicated to gathering diverse forms of 
screenshot-taking malware. The only screenlogger samples 
can be found in general malware datasets in the middle of 
other types of malware. However, such general datasets would 
not allow us to test our future detection approach nor to gather 
meaningful insights into screenloggers’ behaviour. There are 
several reasons for that. 
 First, general datasets authors do not indicate whether 
their dataset contains screenshot-taking malware or not. They 
usually just indicate that the dataset contains “spyware”, 
without giving information about their functionalities and 
particularly the screenshot functionality. To the best of our 
knowledge, only one dataset explicitly includes screenlogers’ 
network traffic related to well-known malware programs Zeus 
and Ares [18]. However, the collected network traffic of the 
aforementioned screenloggers is not representative of the real 
screenloggers’ behaviour because authors only consider a 
periodic screen recording of 400 seconds, whereas recent 
screenloggers are very diverse. Thus, existing malware 
datasets include very few screenloggers samples and they are 
limited in nature because they only reflect a small number of 
characteristics describing a very specific screenlogger 
behaviour. 
Second, the screenshot functionality is often not executed 
immediately when a machine is infected. In particular, for 
RATs (Remote Access Trojans), screenshot-taking is 
triggered by a command sent by the remote attacker. There are 
also some cases where screenshots are triggered by user events 
(such as mouse clicks), or by the execution of certain programs 
or specific web pages (online banking, etc.). Consequently, 
even if existing datasets may contain screenloggers, the 
screenshot functionality will most probably not be used 
anyway, preventing us from making observations. 
Third, as mentioned before, legitimate applications are 
increasingly taking screenshots. These application are very 
diverse: screen sharing (e.g. Skype [19], Screen Leap [20], 
Join.me [20]), remote control (e.g. TeamViewer [22], 
Netviewer [23], 
GoToMyPC [24]), screen casting (e.g. Camtasia [25], 
CamStudio [26], Ezvid [27]), parental or employees control 
(e.g. Verity [28], Kidlogger [29], Norton Online Family7 
|68]), or screenshot taking and editing (e.g. Picpick [30], 
Snipping Tool [31], FastStone Capture [32]). Thus, in order to 
effectively analyse spyware using the screenshot capture 
feature, it is critical to be able to understand and identify the 
similarities and differences between their behaviour and that 
of legitimate applications. However, there is currently no 
dataset of legitimate applications taking screenshots and 
again, even when some of the legitimate applications 
contained in the da- taset can take screenshots, it is important 
to make sure that this functionality is trig- gered at the time of 
execution (for example by enabling screensharing during a 
Skype call). 
Because of the small amount of works on screenloggers in 
the literature, existing malware datasets are not suitable for 
creating an efficient detection method. They do not mention 
whether screenloggers are included or not, and when they do, 
only basic and naïve behaviours are covered due to the 
specificities of screenshot triggering. The same problems 
apply to legitimate screenshot taking applications. 
III. THREAT MODEL AND SYSTEM MODEL 
A. System model 
The targeted systems are desktop environments. The main 
reason why our work focuses on computer operating systems 
is that the screenshot functionality is a legitmate functionality 
offered to any application. In contrast, on smartphones the 
principle is that apps cannot take screenshots of other apps, 
and, the only way of doing this is to exploit specific 
vulnerabilities or to divert some libraries but with many 
limitations (permission asked to the user at the beginning of 
each session, icon in the notification bar). Therefore, the 
architecture designs of mobile systems and computer systems 
are fundamentally different, which may lead to different 
solutions. 
Another assumption is that the victims are not particularly 
security-aware: they are not necessarily aware of the existing 
threats and will not install a specific protection against 
screenshots, such as a specific viewer to open documents in a 
secure environment preventing screenshots (by using the 
setWindowDisplayAffinity function [33]). Moreover, the 
targeted victims may be any individual or organisation, 
ranging from typical laptop users to small companies or 
powerful institutions. 
B. Threat model 
Our threat model is composed of the victim, the attacker, 
and a spyware with the screenshot functionality. In this model, 
a screenshot is defined as an exact reproduction in an image 
format of what is displayed on the screen. Therefore, we 
exclude the case of malicious web extension taking 
screenshots by reconstructing the display from the DOM [34, 
35]. Moreover, we do not cover privacy leaks due to 
applications taking screenshots of themselves for commercial 
purposes, e.g. session replay [36]. Shoulder surfing is also out 
of the scope of this work. 
The attacker’s main goal is to extract sensitive data 
(personal information, business information, or classified 
information). They may infect the system using common 
methods such as Trojans or social engineering, or through a 
malicious insider. The adversary has no physical access to the 
victim’s device. They have no knowledge about the system 
and tools installed on it before infection. The attacker does not 
require any advanced hardware. They have no interaction with 
the victim’s device except his capability of receiving files 
transmitted by the spyware via the network and optionally the 
possibility to send commands to the spyware. The adversary 
may be a simple individual acting alone or a more powerful 
entity, such as an institutional or a cybercriminal group. 
 
IV. SAMPLES COLLECTING AND ANALYSIS APPROACH 
A. Spyware and legitimate applications samples collecting 
In order to effectively analyse spyware using the screen 
capture feature, it is essential to be able to understand and 
identify the similarities and differences between their 
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behaviour and that of legitimate applications. Thus, the first 
step of our approach aims to constitute a significant sample of 
legitimate applications and screenlogger type spyware, with 
varied and representative behaviour. 
The names and hashcodes of our samples were collected 
from MITRE [3], which does not contain malware samples but 
lists 60 malware with screenshot functionality. The hashcodes 
can be found in the Indicators Of Compromise (IOCs) section 
of the security reports. Based on these haschodes, we were 
able to collect 600 spyware samples from VirusShare [37], 
AVCaesar [38], Malshare [39] and VirusSign [40]. We also 
collected some source codes on open archives such as Github. 
For the collection of legitimate applications, 94 software 
using the screenshot function were identified and collected. 
These applications come from different representative 
categories of screenshots uses among the most popular. These 
categories are: screen sharing, remote control, screen casting, 
parental control or employee control and capture and edit 
screenshots. 
B. Samples execution and reports generation 
The execution of spyware and legitimate applications is an 
essential step to understand their behaviour, in particular the 
identification of actions that trigger the screen capture 
function. Given the nature of the studied software, their 
execution was carried out in a secure environment. Spyware 
are executed on a Windows 10 virtual machine (Inetsim 
internet configuration) [43]. After each execution, the machine 
is reinitialised from a snapshot of the non-infected initial state. 
Then the behaviour was analysed using dedicated software: 
Wireshark [41] and API Monitor [42]. 
C. Reports analysis 
In order to make sure that the collected samples were 
actually taking screenshots, it was necessary to find a sequence 
of API calls that characterises screenshot-taking. This 
sequence must be precise enough that non-screenshot cases 
would be excluded and at the same time not too precise to 
avoid false negatives. The difficulty lies in the fact that there 
is no unique screenshot function proposed by Windows APIs 
but rather a sequence of 5-6 functions that can be used 
alternatively with other functions and that can individually be 
used in other contexts. Thus, it is impossible to deduce that a 
screenshot was taken by only looking at a unique function. 
To define the criteria characterising a screen-capture, 
thirty legitimate screenshot-taking applications were analysed. 
It shown that different API calls sequences can be used for the 
purpose of screenshot taking. Two main libraries are used: the 
Windows Graphics Device API (GDI) and the Desktop 
Duplication API which replaces mirror drivers. We therefore 
had to make flowcharts with different alternatives at each step, 
as illustrated in Figure 1, and transcribe these into a script that 
takes as an input the API calls reports and returns information 
such as the number of screen-captures taken and their 
frequency (if the screenshots are taken at a regular time 
interval).  
For the GDI library, using the flowsharts we identify a 
screen capture by the call of one function that retrieves the 
content of the screen (GetDC, GetWindowsDC, CreateDCA 
or CreateDCW), followed by the call of the Bitblt or the 
StretchBlt function. The script ensures that BitBlt’s hdcSource 
parameter is the value that was returned by the function 
capturing the screen’s content. 
A rarer sequence using GetDIBits, CreateDIBitmap, 
SetDIBits and CreateBitmap functions was found in some 
applications (e.g. JoinMe [21] and AnyDesk). When this 
sequence is used, BitBlt is called with small size parameters 
values whereas in the above sequence it is called with the size 
of the screen. 
 For the Desktop Duplication API, a screenshot is identified 
by the use of the AcquireNextFrame, GetFrameMoveRects, 
and GetFrameDirtyRects functions, which allow to capture 
only the part of the screen that changed compared to the 
previous frame. This library is mainly used by the applications 
that capture the screen continuously (screen sharing, remote 
control, screen casting). 
Javaheri et al. [44] proposed a method for screenloggers 
detection and they also identified criteria based on Windows 
API calls to characterise a screen capture operation. Their 
solution was to look at the GetWindowsDC and Bitblt 
functions. This is similar to the criteria we identified, but it 
does not take into account the other equivalents functions 
(StretchBlt, GetDC, …) nor the other libraries that can be used 
(Desktop Duplication API). Thus, it does not allow to identify 
all the screen capturing applications. Moreover, the 
parameters of the function are not verified especially the 
hdcSource parameter of the Bitblt function which must refer 
to the screen content. Otherwise, it means that Bitblt was used 
for a different purpose, and some applications that do not 
capture the screen can be identified as taking screenshots, 
which is problematic too. 
By running our scripts on the found samples, we realised 
that no sample but one (over 600 samples) were actually 
taking screenshots. Different reasons can be put forward to 
explain this unexpected result: 
 Many malware programs infect their targets through 
different steps, the screenshot module is often not 
present from the beginning and is rather downloaded 
from the server afterwards. However, today, almost 
all the malware servers are dead and even if they 
aren’t, we do not allow the samples to connect to the 
network for obvious security reasons. For example, 
the Prikormka malware has a “downloader module”, 
which function is to download other modules which 
are not present at the time of infection [65]. Silence 
downloads a dropper which will communicate with 
the server to obtain the screenshot plugin [12]. 
 
Fig. 1: GDI API calls flowchart 
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 Some malware programs are fitted with anti-sandbox 
/anti-analysis capabilities. For example, ZeusPanda 
[45] looks for files showing the presence of Virtual 
Box, VMware, Wireshark among many others on the 
infected device. It also looks for these tools in the list 
of running processes. If it realises that it is within an 
analysis environment, it does not run. 
 Sometimes, the screenshot settings (Should 
screenshots be taken? When? Targeting what 
applications? …) are defined by the attacker before 
infection and impossible to modify afterwards with 
only the sample at our disposal (particularly KeyBoys 
[46] and AgentTesla malware). 
 In most cases, the screenshot functionality is triggered 
by a command coming from the attacker. However, 
analysis reports rarely indicate this command. 
Moreover, the samples available in current datasets 
only include the client part of malware. 
Thus, as samples that are available on current malware 
datasets are not taking screenshots during their execution, it 
was necessary to do a more extensive research to find malware 
whose screenshot function can be enabled. 
D. Collecting widely used and available malware 
screenlogging tools 
Often, malware authors do not bother implementing the 
screenshot functionality themselves and, instead, reuse RATs 
(Remote Access Trojans) or “Pentest tools” widely available 
on the internet. The only element that varies between different 
malware is therefore the infection medium which is not 
relevant for this paper. Several well-known cybercriminals, 
having realised significant attacks, use this kind of tools. By 
way of illustration and in a non-exhaustive manner, one could 
cite: the FIN7 group (particularly the GRIFFON and 
Halfbaked malware) using Carbanak for screen capture [10], 
the Group5 group using njRAT and Nano Core RAT [57] and 
the CopyKittens group using CobaltStrike and Meterpreter 
[58]. 
Thus, by analysing these tools, it seems reasonable to hope 
covering a majority of screenshot taking malware. As they are 
widely available, we were able to get working samples (with 
the client and server parts) and even source codes for the 
available ones. We constructed Screeminals, a dataset 
completely specific to screenshot taking malware, containing 
118 samples. Most of them were source codes that we had to 
compile and make working. We ran each of them to ensure 
that the screen capturing function was triggered. Given the 
dangerous nature of the studied software, their execution was 
carried out in a secure environment, with the client and server 
parts being ran on two different virtual machines. 
E. Ensuring the completeness of the dataset  
A major issue in our work was to ensure the completeness 
and the representativeness of our screenlogger dataset, a 
complete and representative dataset being defined as a dataset 
in which all the behaviours displayed by well-known 
screenshot taking spyware are included with real proportions. 
Imposing this constraint is particularly important in the case 
of screenloggers. Indeed, as we will see in Section V.A, the 
analysis of the security reports of the existing in-the-wild 
screenloger shows the existence of various behaviours, while, 
as we will see it in Section V.B, most screenloggers samples 
that are available display quite identical and fairly basic 
behaviour (continuous high-frequency screenshot taking 
triggered by a command). However, to develop an effective 
detection approach, it is necessary to take into account all the 
types of behaviours that exist in the wild. Including these rarer 
behaviours could help detect screenloggers which remain 
undetected otherwise. To ensure this completeness criterion, 
we therefore proceeded as follows: 1/analysis of the malware 
security reports listed on MITRE [3], and, depending on the 
results of this analysis, determination of the list of behaviours 
that must be present in the dataset to ensure its completeness 
(Section V.A), 2/ analysis of the screenlogger samples we 
were able to collect (Section V.B) and 3/ implementation of a 
tool to generate the behaviours of the list that are not present 
in the collected dataset (Section V.C). 
V. RESULTS 
A. Analysis of security reports of screenloggers and 
characterisation of the completeness criteria  
The first step in analysing the behaviour of screenshot 
taking malware was to gather high level information from one 
hundred security reports recovered on MITRE [3]. After that, 
a set of criteria that can discriminate screenshot taking 
malware from each other has been identified. These criteria 
cover all the main operating actions of screenloggers. Some of 
them are about the way by which the screenshot feature is 
trigged and executed, others are about storage and 
compression, and other ones regard network communication 
and data transmission. These results imply several 
observations: 
1) Screen capture 
As described in Section IV.C, two main libraries can be 
used, GDI and Desktop Duplication API. Our analysis showed 
that existing malware do not seem to use the functionalities 
offered by Desktop Duplication API. 
Regarding the triggering of the screen-capture 
functionality, the first observation is that, a vast majority of 
screenloggers (67%) wait for a command from the C2 server  
to start capturing the screen. This imposes an important 
constraint on the dataset: we must gather both the server and 
the client parts of the screenloggers in order to be able to 
trigger the screenshot functionality ourselves. 
Independently of the need of a command to start taking 
screenshots, different events can be the cause of the screen-
capture triggering. These events can be pre-configured in the 
malware compiled file, or they can be set on-the-fly upon the 
reception of a command once a victim has been reached. For 
instance, Remexi is pre-configured to take screenshots when 
some applications of interest are opened, after a configurable 
number of mouse clicks, and does not need to receive any 
command to specify these screenshot-taking parameters [47]. 
On the other hand, Biscuit [51] and Powersploit [49, 50] take 
screenshots at a configurable frequency which is set in a 
command received from the C2 server. Other parameters can 
be set in the command, such as a time slot.  
As shown in Figure 2, the different screenshot triggering 
events that were identified are: frequency (35%), punctual 
command (38%), application of interest (9%), mouse clicks 
(3%) and unique screenshot upon infection (5%).  
Regarding frequency, the observed screen-capturing 
frequencies range from 2 sec (Cross RAT [69]) to 15 min 
(Prikormka [65]). Malware offering remote desktop 
functionality have a higher frequency, which may reach 30 
frames/sec (Xtreme RAT [66]). The screenshot frequency may 
vary over time: for example, Prikormka has a normal 
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frequency of 15 min but it increases to reach 5 sec when VoIP 
applications such as Skype or Viber are open.  
Some other screenloggers allow on-demand screenshots: 
they have a specific command to take one screenshot at a time 
(this is the category “ponctual command” on Figure 2). Most 
malware offering remote desktop also offer an independent 
screenshot command (e.g. Azorult [67], Carbanak [11], 
NetWire [68]). 
Some few malwares have different behaviours as they 
capture screenshots in response to mouse clicks (e.g. Remexi 
[47]) or to the launching of a target application (e. g. 
Catchamas [48]). This last category of screenlogger waits for 
a specific application to be open by looking windows titles 
(Remexi [47], RTM [9], T9000 [52]) or the list of running 
processes (Biscuit [51], Flame for instant messengers [60]). 
Finally, some malwares only take one screenshot during their 
whole execution for reconnaissance purposes (see if the victim 
is worth infecting e.g. Cannon [15]). 
2) Screenshots format and storage 
This criterion may determine to a certain extent the 
possible congestion of the file storage system, which can be an 
indication for detection. Moreover, it has a considerable 
influence on the use of network resources. 
Regarding the screenshots size, even if this information is 
often not available (no information for 55% of the security 
reports), it follows from our study that more than 37% of 
screenloggers capture the entire screen without targeting a 
particular area or window. Nevertheless, three other operating 
modes are represented, even if it is in small proportions. These 
are the capture of a target window (T9000 [52]), of all 
overlapping windows (Invisimole [53]) or of a delimited area 
of the screen (Zeus Panda [45]). Interestingly, the Remexi 
malware [47] proposes a parameter for full screen or only 
active window screenshots. 
Like the image size, the chosen format for images 
representation has a direct impact on memory / disk and 
network usage. 43% of screenloggers for which information is 
available use the JPG format and 32% the PNG format. Some 
other malwares opt for other formats such as BMP (12%), and 
to a lesser extent AVI, WCRT and RAR. 
The information of whether malware use memory 
representations or disk persistent storage of image files is 
unfortunately not available for almost half of considered 
screenloggers. However, hard drives seem to be the most used 
storage mean (90% of malware for which the information is 
available). 
3) Exfiltration of captured data 
All the malwares of this study transmit the captured 
screenshots to remote and malicious servers. 40% of 
screenloggers for which the protocol is identified use HTTP, 
which increases their chances of going unnoticed in the large 
HTTP flow passing through almost all machines. HTTPS, 
FTP, SMTP and even SOAP complete the list of used 
protocols. We can also notice that a non-negligible proportion 
of malware (20%) does not have an application layer network 
protocol, and simply use the transport layer by sending TCP 
packets. 
Regarding the event triggering screenshot sending, four 
possible behaviours have been identified. The first one, which 
is also the most common, is immediate sending of the captured 
image directly after the screen capture (e.g. Magic Hound [61], 
RTM [9]). The explanation could be that many of these 
malware programs use the screenshots for a real-time purpose 
such as remote control on the victim’s machine or real time 
observation of the victim’s activity. The three other 
behaviours are the screenshots sending at a regular frequency 
(e.g. Micropsia [54], Flame [60], Rover [62]), when a specific 
command is received from the C2 server (e.g. Biscuit [51], 
Powruner [55]), or each time a pre-defined number of 
screenshots is taken (e.g. RTM after 6 screenshots [9], 
Pteranodon after a configurable number of screenshots [56]). 
This criterion is important because it determines the network 
traffic characteristics (size of the packets, frequency of 
sending, etc.). 
 
Fig. 3: Image files encryption in the malware security reports  
 
For the malware for which this information was available, 
we observed that the encryption techniques are very diverse, 
each malware designing its own encryption method often by 
combing several techniques. As illustrated in Figure 3, the 
encryption methods are more or less sophisticated, some 
malware only using XOR operations (e.g. T9000 [52]) or 
base64 encoding (e.g. Powruner [55]), and other ones 
combining several encryption algorithms such as Chopstick. 
Bronze Buttler uses two alternative encryption techniques: 
RC4+base 64 and AES [4]. Knowing the encryption methods 
can be important to detect the exfiltration of image type files, 
which will be more easily discovered if there is no or very 
simple encoding (base 64, zip, rar). 
 
4) Completeness requirements for a screenlogger 
dataset 
Based on these results, we were able to define criteria 
ensuring completeness of the dataset. The different behaviours 
our dataset must include are summed up in Table 1. 
Fig. 2: Screenshots trigerring in the malware security reports 
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Table 1. Completeness requirements 
Windows lib. 
used to take 
screenshots 
GDI (with all the alternative functions) / 




Frequency / Punctual command / 
Application of interest / Mouse clicks / 




Whole screen / Window of interest / All 
overlapping windows / Around the 
mouse pointer / Configurable area 
Storage HDD / Memory 
Image file format JPG / PNG/ BMP 
Encryption Yes / No 
Communication 
protocol TCP / HTTP(S) / FTP(S) / SMTP(S) 
 
B. Analysis of the malware dataset (collected in Section 
IV.D) 
1) Screen capture 
The malwares of our dataset exclusively use the GDI 
library to capture screenshots. Therefore, this does not include 
the Desktop Duplication API. Moreover, all malware 
composing the dataset need to receive a command to start 
taking screenshots. The opposite behaviour (start taking 
screenshots automatically) is not represented. 
Regarding the event triggering the screen capturing 
functionality, the two most current behaviours are the capture 
of the screen at a given frequency (38%) or on-demand upon 
reception of a specific command allowing to take one 
screenshot (59%). Several screenloggers, such as Xtreme 
RAT, Spynet and NetWire, offer the two possibilities. Remcos 
constitutes a particular case because its screenshots are 
triggered by the occurrences of some target keywords in the 
titles of the opened windows. Two behaviours that were 
observed in the previous section are not represented here: 
screenshots triggered by mouse clicks and unique screen 
capture during the whole execution for reconnaissance 
purpose. 
Regarding the values of the screen-capturing frequencies, 
they range from 17 ms to 60 s, and several screenloggers have 
a configurable frequency (e.g. Powershell-RAT [49], 
Powersploit [50]). Interestingly, thanks to the source codes we 
were able to observe that some malware use a random number 
between each screen capture and therefore don’t take the 
screenshots at exactly equals intervals of time. For instance, 
Carbanak draws a random number between 15000 ms and 
30000 ms at each capture, and CtOSRAT draws a random 
number between 17 ms and 31 ms. 
2) Screenshots format and storage 
In the constituted dataset, 57% of malware use JPG coding 
to represent images. The remaining ones use BMP and PNG 
formats in equal proportions. These observations appear to 
correspond to the theoretical ones of section B. 
Regarding the screenshot size, a majority of the selected 
malware (86%) captures the entire screen at each shot. 
However, 14% of malware have smarter and more optimized 
behaviours as they capture either a specified zone using its 
coordinates (7% e.g. Spynet, Xtreme RAT) or only difference 
(changes) between 2 successive screens (Gh0st). Moreover, 
we found a behaviour that we did not observe in Section B, 
which is the capture of the zone around the mouse click, which 
is an option proposed by Pupy. This enables sending smaller 
packets, and this can be useful in attacks targeting online 
banking users which enter their password using a virtual 
keyboard, as proposed by many banks [63]. 
In our dataset 61% of malware only use a memory 
representation of the captured image, while 39% have 
persistent storage strategies on disks. On this criterion, it is 
quite clear that the results are the exact opposite of those 
concluded in section B, where most of the malware were using 
disk storage. 
3) Exfiltration of captured data 
A very large proportion of the studied malware does not 
have an application network layer and therefore 94% of them 
use only the transport layer to exfiltrate data in the form of 
TCP packets. 6% of our samples use the HTTP protocol. 
Regarding the screenshots sending triggering, all malwares of 
the dataset send captured images to a remote server 
immediately after capturing the screen. This is unfortunately 
not sufficiently representative of the potential behaviours 
presented in section B. 
Regarding encryption, the major part of the analysed 
malwares do not encrypt the sent data. Only 25% of them do 
it, all using different encryption algorithms.  
This dataset is, to the best of our knowledge, the first one 
dedicated to screenshot-taking malware and it is available on 
Github [64]. Even if 118 is a significant size, it is not sufficient 
to represent all the possible behaviours of such malware. 
Indeed, the analysis results shown that some behaviours and 
characteristics are missing whereas they were observed in the 
security reports analysed in the previous part. 
C. Implementation of a “screenlogger generator” 
 
 
Fig. 4:  Screenlogger generator (abstract architecture) 
To make our dataset complete, our solution consists in 
developing a configurable tool that enriches the constructed 
dataset with all the missing behaviours mentioned in the 
analysed security reports but not found while analysing our 
dataset. Although not ideal, this solution will allow to have a 
complete toolset for studying the screenshot-taking 
behaviours. It takes the form of a “screenlogger generator” 
which generates a payload according to the specified 
parameters. Then, this payload is run on the victim’s machine 
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whereas the server part is waiting for connections on the 
attacker’s machine (Figure 4). Measures were taken to prevent 
this tool from being used for malicious purposes. 
If the option “without command” is selected, all the 
parameters, including the dynamic ones, will be set at the 
building time and the payload will start taking screenshots 
according to these parameters directly upon infection of a new 
victim. 
 
On the contrary, if the option “with command” is selected, 
the dynamic parameters cannot be specified at the building 
time and the screenlogger will wait for a command from the 
C2 server to start capturing the screen (the dynamic 
parameters are indicated in the command). This command 
may be used to take isolated or continuous screenshots. 
 
The generated screenloggers which make the dataset 
complete can be found along with the tools mentioned in part 
IV.D on the following github repository: [64]. Again, for 
security reasons, the executable is not provided. 
D. Analysis of legitimate screenshot-taking applications 
We have assembled a dataset of 94 applications taking 
screenshots, among the most commonly used. These 
applications are analysed with the same criteria and metrics as 
malware. 
1) Screen capture 
Legitimate applications use the two main available 
libraries to take screenshots: GDI (76%) and Desktop 
Duplication API (17%). The Desktop Duplication API is more 
represented than for the malware case because it is used by 
several real-time applications. Indeed, this API is adapted to 
this type of applications: it allows to take screenshots in a fast 
and robust way by sending only the difference between two 
consecutive screens. However, this is a quite recent API 
(Windows 8 and above) compared to GDI, and this could 
explain why it is not used in malware. 
Regarding screen capture triggering, screen captures are 
triggered only while the application is executed, and the 
command usually does not come from distant servers. 
However, this observation is unfortunately not systematic as 
some types of legitimate applications such as remote control 
respond to distant commands to establish the connection and 
start the screensharing session. 
Some applications may have a similar behaviour to 
malware in the way screenshots are triggered. For example, 
Spyrix Free Keylogger takes screenshots each time the user 
switches window or opens a new window. Hubstaff, an 
employee control application, takes screenshots in an irregular 
way. 
2) Screenshots format and storage 
We can notice that legitimate applications do not seem to 
target overlapping windows, as opposed to some 
screenloggers (Figure 5). 
Regarding screenshots storage, we observe different 
behaviours depending on the type of application. 57% of the 
selected applications only use memory representations of the 
captured screenshots and do not generate disk persistent 
storage. These are the screen sharing and remote-control 
applications This is due to the fact that these applications use 
temporary files which are erased after a real-time use of the 
data. On the contrary, the screen casting, screenshot editing 
and employee control applications store images in the disk. 
An important part of legitimate applications for which 
obtaining the information was possible, use png and jpg 
formats for saving captured screenshots. Other applications 
use video formats such as AVI, MPEG4 and VMW to store 
images. 
3) Exfiltration of captured data 
An important part of the legitimate applications (45%) 
does not send the screenshots over the network because this is 
not their purpose (screenshots editing, screen casting). The 
other ones often use proprietary protocols (31%). Few ones 
use standard known protocols such as RFB (Remote Frame 
Buffer protocol) or HTTPS. Applications of our dataset 
mainly use SSL or TLS encryptions before files transmission 
(44%). Few of them, such as TightVNC and UltraVNC do not 
encrypt files. 
E. Differences between legitimate and malicious 
applications 
1) Screen capture 
Malware only use the GDI library to capture screenshots 
while 17% of legitimate applications use Desktop Duplication 
API. Frequency is not an interesting criterion because, as 
malwares, legitimate applications display various behaviours: 
irregular screenshots (screenshot capture and editing), high 
frequency (screenshare, remote control), low frequency 
(employee/children monitoring).  Regarding screenshots 
triggering, 67% of malware start captures in response to C2 
server commands, whereas in legitimate applications screen 
capturing is strongly correlated to the use of the application 
and most of the time cannot occur in response to distant 
commands or events unrelated to the current application. 
However, this cannot be generalised because of 
children/employee control programs which have a behaviour 
akin to screenloggers.  
2) Screenshot format and storage 
An important difference that we noticed is the screen 
capturing area: a vast majority of malware take the full screen 
whereas it is more diverse for legitimate applications: only 
37% of them capture the full screen, and the other ones either 
capture only part of the screen, a target window or only the 
difference between two successive screens. This contrast may 
be explained by the fact that most screenshot-taking malware 
do not look for a specific information on the infected device, 
but rather spy the user’s activity in general. 
Even if the format used by many legitimate applications 
for screenshots compression and storage remains unknown, it 
is possible to notice that the same formats are used both by 
malware programs and by legitimate applications to store and 
Fig. 5: Screen capture size (legitimate applications) 
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send the images, the most commons being JPG and PNG. 
Video formats such as AVI may be used in both cases. 
Moreover, many of these applications use memory 
representations, for immediate local processing on the host 
machine. This trend is much less evident in the case of 
malware. Indeed, the security reports study shows a strong 
inclination towards the use of the hard drive for storage, but 
this observation does not occur in our dataset where memory 
storage takes the upper hand. 
3) Exfiltration of captured data 
An important difference lies in the fact that a large part of 
legitimate applications only uses screenshots to process them 
locally without transmitting them unlike malware which 
systematically send captured files over the network. 
Applications sending screenshots do it directly after the 
capture as they are real-time applications. A majority of 
malware have the same behaviour except few ones which may 
exhibit different sending patterns, such as sending the image 
files after a certain number of captures or upon reception of a 
command. Regarding the communication protocol, only one 
of the malware programs we analysed took the trouble to 
implement and integrate a proprietary protocol [51], as is the 
case of many legitimate applications. Thus, even if this cannot 
be considered as the only differentiation criterion, the use of a 
proprietary protocol by a software reduces the probability that 
it is malware. Encryption protocols used by malware and 
legitimate applications to encrypt images are quite different. 
Indeed, if a minority of legitimate applications do not encrypt 
the data they send, most of them encrypt it and for that they 
use the well-known standards SSL and TLS. On the other 
hand, 75% of malwares of the dataset do not even encrypt their 
data, and in the theoretical study it was observed that most of 
them use “home-made” and rudimentary encryption 
techniques combining XOR operations, base 64 encoding and 
symmetric encoding algorithms such as RC2 and RC4. Few of 
them use RSA and SSL/TLS. One of the possible explanations 
may be that asymmetric encryption often requires more 
computation and that’s why it is less used by malware. 
4) Synthesis 
We mainly distinguish 3 classes of criteria according to 
their degree of differentiation between malware and legitimate 
applications (Table 2). Criteria like compression format or 
screenshot sending triggering don’t seem to highlight enough 
differences between legitimate applications and malware to be 
used effectively in a detection methodology. In the second 
class we find criteria such as screenshot function library, 
storage or communication protocol. These are criteria 
presenting quite significant differentiation but with some 
specific cases and exceptions making generalisation difficult. 
The third and final class includes criteria, with significant 
degrees of differentiation, such as screenshot files sending and 
files encryption. However, a detection methodology limited 
only to these latter criteria cannot be effective because of the 
potential false positives. Thus, an effective malware 
screenshot detection approach must not only be based on the 
criteria of this third class but also integrate those of the second 
class with possibly different weights. Indeed, a software that 
uses a proprietary protocol with TLS/SSL encryption for 
network communication or which does not send the 
screenshots over the network is very likely to be a legitimate 
application, whereas one that does not encrypt data or just uses 
base64 encoding and that use a standard protocol such as TCP, 
FTP or SMTP might be a malware.  
VI. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK 
This work is the first one presenting a study of the screen 
capture functionality of malware. We proposed an in-depth 
analysis of a functionality which is quite unknown whereas it 
is one of the most prejudicial to privacy. 
This study showed that there are several reasons 
explaining this lack of knowledge on screenloggers. The main 
one is that in the majority of cases, a specific event such as the 
reception of a command, the opening of an application of 
interest, or a number of mouse clicks, is needed to trigger the 
screen capture, which explains why it is neglected in the 
malware detection works. Studying the screenshot 
functionality implies being able to detect when a program 
captures the screen, which requires a meticulous analysis of 
the API calls reports, as many different sequences of functions 
can be called to take a screenshot.  
We thus built a dataset of working screenloggers, ensuring 
that the screen capture functionality is enabled. More 
precisely, this work was the first to: 
 Analyse API calls reports of more than ninety 
screenshot- taking programs to determine screen 
capturing API call sequences 
 Analyse a hundred security reports to extract statistics 
about key aspects of the screnloggers’ behaviour 
 Propose a screenlogger classification according to 
several criteria 
 Define completeness criteria for a screenlogger 
dataset 
 Construct a dataset meeting those criteria and 
including legitimate screenshot-taking applications 
 Implement a ‘screenlogger generator’ which 
corresponds to the completeness criteria 
 Use the analysis results to give insights for 
screenloggers detection and differentiation from 
legitimate screenshot applications 
 This work is a first step towards the implementation of a 
detection technique for screen-capturing malware, which 
represents an important part of modern spyware. Since this 
functionality is ignored by current detection techniques, 
focusing on it could allow to detect powerful malware which 
are not detected otherwise.  
Thus, more generally, this work proposes a new detection 
approach which, instead of mechanically running thousands of 
samples in a sandbox and relying on machine learning to find 
discriminative features, focuses on one specific functionality 
by analysing it more deeply both in malware programs and in 
legitimate applications to find differences and guidelines for 
detection. We deeply believe that the only effective detection 
method against screenloggers must be multi-criteria and give 
different weights to each criterion depending on whether it 
constitutes an important differentiation or not. This constitutes 
the objective of our future work. 
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